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ARGUMENT 
Defendants admit that they took Mr. Briggs' money and never delivered the goods, 
and this fact has forced Briggs to litigate just to get his money back. In their Brief of 
Appellees ("Opp'n Br."), Defendants have misrepresented the applicable law and Mr. 
Briggs' legal arguments. Defendants have further taken unwarranted liberties with the 
facts in evidence and the record, including such whoppers as "Mr. Briggs knew that his 
$70,000 damages claim was meritless." (Opp'n Br. at 34) Needless to say, Mr. Briggs has 
consistently denied ever knowing that his claim was meritless and Defendants have 
admitted his claim had at least $8,939.19 worth of merit (Opp'n Br. at 30). In addition, 
Defendants admit that there are material facts in dispute. Finally, Defendants rely 
(perhaps unintentionally) on case law that supports Mr. Briggs' position that summary 
judgment was improperly granted.1 
Rebutting every falsehood, mischaracterization, and errant legal citation in 
Defendants' brief would be needlessly burdensome for both Mr. Briggs and this Court, so 
this Reply Brief addresses the errors and admissions that directly affect the summary 
judgments at issue in this appeal. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite a raft of disputed facts, the Third District Court granted two summary 
1 See below for our discussion regarding Defendants' reasonable time inference, 
construction against the drafter, and materiality arguments - each of which raises 
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judgments against Mr. Briggs. Since the only issues on appeal involve summary 
judgment, this Court addresses only two questions: 1. are there genuine disputes 
regarding material facts, and 2. did the District Court correctly apply the law? See 
Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979) ("Our inquiry on review is whether 
there is any genuine issue as to any material fact, and if there is not, whether the plaintiffs 
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.") This Court reviews the District Court's 
judgment for correctness. 
The first summary judgment dismissed Mr. Briggs1 entire complaint (Record on appeal 
("R.") at 375; addendum to Brief of Appellant ("Addendum") tab 6). The second granted 
Defendants' counterclaim for attorney's fees (R. at 866; Addendum tab 7). 
II. DEFENDANTS INCORRECTLY STATE THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Before addressing Defendants' arguments on the substance of this appeal, we must 
address their inappropriate standard of review and marshaling arguments. Throughout 
their brief, Defendants wrongly claim that the District Court's ruling requires Mr. Briggs 
to "marshal the evidence" supporting the District Court's purported factual finding that 
Mr. Briggs filed this case in bad faith {see, e.g., Opp'n Br. at 3, 29-30, 38, 39, 40). 
Defendants further claim that the District Court's purported factual finding that Mr. 
Briggs asserted his claims in bad faith is to be reviewed "under a clearly erroneous 
questions for the finder of fact to decide. 
5 
standard." (Id.) 
Summary judgment does not resolve factual disputes; the District Court erred by 
making a finding at all. Whether the District Court's finding was right or wrong is 
immaterial to this appeal - the issue is whether the District Court could make any finding 
of fact on summary judgment. Defendants' burdensome and inaccurate argument focusing 
on the correctness of the finding is immaterial and does not assist this Court on appeal. 
A. Appellant does not need to marshal the facts in an appeal of summary 
judgment 
Utah law directly contradicts Defendants' claim that Mr. Briggs must marshal the 
evidence in a summary judgment appeal. 
When appealing a district court's grant of summary judgment, however, the appellant has 
no obligation to marshal the evidence. ... At the summary judgment stage, the district 
court is not concerned about the sufficiency of any evidence because it does not resolve 
any factual disputes. Therefore, the defendants' marshaling argument was inappropriate. 
Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23, ^ |16 n.6, 70 P.3d 904 
(citation omitted). Defendants' effort to throw a monkey wrench into Mr. Briggs' appeal 
is just as inappropriate as it was for the defendants in Smith. 
B. Correctness is appropriate standard of review 
• The recent case, In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, 86 P.3d 712 provides a 
lot of guidance for the issues in this appeal. Defendants, however, wrongly rely on it for 
their assertion that the proper standard of review is "clearly erroneous" (see, e.g., Opp'n 
Br. at 3, ffl[8&9). What Defendants do not tell this Court is that, in Sonnenreich, the trial 
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court dismissed the complaint by summary judgment, but did not grant attorney's fees 
until a separate motion was made and heard: "Following this dismissal, Sonnenreich filed 
a motion for attorney fees pursuant to section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code." Sonnenreich, 
supra, [^10. This distinguishes Sonnenreich from the current case, where the District 
Court awarded attorney's fees in summary judgment, and therefore summary judgment 
standards apply. 
Summary judgment, as the Utah Supreme Court has said, "presents for review only 
conclusions of law because, by definition, cases decided on summary judgment do not 
resolve factual disputes. We therefore accord no deference to a trial court's legal 
conclusions given to support the grant of summary judgment, but review them for 
correctness." Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111-1112 (Utah 
1991)(citations omitted). 
Bad faith, in the context of attorney's fees, is a question of fact to be decided by the 
trier of fact: "The issue of bad faith ... is a question of fact to be ascertained by the finder 
of fact." Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527, 534 n.3 (Utah 1993). Even 
regarding the award of attorney's fees in summary judgment, the District Court cannot 
make findings of fact because summary judgment does not resolve factual disputes. 
Therefore, the fact of bad faith must be undisputed: "Although it may be unusual for the 
facts concerning attorney fees to be undisputed, the rule is no different where the subject 
of the summary judgment is a claim for attorney fees." Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 110 
7 
P.2d 163, 168 (Utah App. 1989). 
III. DEFENDANTS9 "REASONABLE TIME" ARGUMENT CREATES A 
QUESTION OF FACT, INVALIDATING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In his Nov. 9, 1999 letter (Briggs Offer), Mr. Briggs tells Defendants that they have 
until Nov. 20, 1999 to get back with him and totally resolve this matter. (R. at 184; 
Addendum tab 2) Defendants argue that Mr. Briggs was simply seeking a phone call by 
Nov. 20, 1999 (Opp'n Br. at 18-19). Mr. Briggs has testified by affidavit that he 
demanded performance by Nov. 20, 1999 (R. at 209, [^15; Addendum tab 4). 
On pages 14-15 of their brief, Defendants argue that the District Court can imply a 
"reasonableness" term to resolve the time for performance ambiguity in Briggs Offer. In 
support of this proposition, Defendants cite Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 
852 (Utah 1998). However, Coulter is fatal to Defendants' argument. 
Coulter revolves, as does this appeal, around a grant of summary judgment. The 
District Court in Coulter granted summary judgment, ruling that an option contract was 
invalid because of the rule against perpetuities, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The 
Utah Supreme Court reversed, saying that the time for performance in the contract was 
ambiguous and ruled that the "reasonable time" implication might avoid an unenforceable 
perpetuity. 
The key that Coulter provides to this appeal is what the court says next: 
What is a reasonable time under the circumstances and whether that period is less than 
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twenty-one years is & factual determination beyond the scope of our review.... Thus, the 
option will be valid under the rule against perpetuities so long as a trier of fact determines 
that a reasonable time in this case is less than twenty-one years. 
Coulter & Smith, Ltd v. Russell 966 P.2d 852, 858-859 (Utah 1998)(emphasis added). 
Coulter thus explains that, while the court can imply a reasonable time for performance if 
the contract on its face is ambiguous, what that reasonable time would be is a question of 
fact and precludes summary judgment (as it did in Coulter). 
IV. CONSTRUCTION AGAINST THE DRAFTER RULE UNAVAILABLE IN 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In a footnote, Defendants try to short-circuit the ambiguity issues by saying that the 
District Court could construe the ambiguities against Mr. Briggs (Opp'n Br. at 19, n.15). 
Defendants' attempt to apply this rule fails on two fronts simultaneously. First, ambiguity 
in a contract precludes summary judgment. Second, the "construed against the drafter" 
rule is not favored in Utah and courts will apply it only as a last resort. 
Utah law holds that ambiguities prevent summary judgment where there is a dispute 
about them. "A motion for summary judgment may not be granted if a legal conclusion is 
reached that an ambiguity exists in the contract and there is a factual issue as to what the 
parties intended." WebBankv. American General Annuity Service Corp., 2002 UT 88, 
J^22, 54 P.3d 1139 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Consequently, ambiguities 
cannot be resolved in summary judgment. 
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In Utah, the rule providing for construction against the drafter is resorted to only if 
extrinsic evidence fails to resolve the parties' intent. In other words, it is a rule of last 
resort. "However, in interpreting a contract, we first look to the four corners of the 
agreement to determine the intent of the parties. If a contract is ambiguous, it will be 
construed against the drafter only if extrinsic evidence fails to clarify the intent of the 
parties." Cherry v. Utah State University, 966 P.2d 866, 869-870 (Utah App. 
1998)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Note that Cherry allows for 
extrinsic evidence and construction rules only after the court has determined the contract 
is ambiguous. WebBank, supra, holds that ambiguity renders summary judgment 
unavailable. 
Furthermore, Defendants have cited no case law for their implied proposition that 
such a rule of construction overrides the "all inferences viewed in a light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party" summary judgment rule when deciding contract ambiguity. 
Defendants do cite two cases in their in their attempt to invoke rules of construction 
against Mr. Briggs, but neither one is helpful. Defendants first cite Jones, Waldo, 
Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996), but that case deals with 
a disputed fee agreement between attorney and client, and the courts rightly hold lawyers 
to a higher standard of clarity in drafting when dealing with clients, and it does not 
2 We note, in passing, that while Defendants want Mr. Briggs' chosen language held 
against him, they do not seem as anxious to apply the same rule to Defendants' choice of 
"proposal" and "If you are in agreement..." in their response to Mr. Briggs' offer. 
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involve summary judgment. Defendants' second case, Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell 
966 P.2d 852 (Utah 1998), applies a principle of interpretation, in the rule against 
perpetuities, which prefers to avoid invalidation: "Furthermore, where two different 
constructions of an instrument are possible, and only one of them results in an interest 
violative of the rule [against perpetuities], the interpretation favoring validity should be 
adopted." Mat 858. 
Defendants again fail to inform the Court that, as discussed above, Coulter reversed 
summary judgment, holding that the ambiguities discussed presented issues for the trier of 
fact 
Defendants' "conduct of the parties" argument {see e.g., Opp'n Br. at 23-24) raises 
similar extrinsic issues, and thus fails for the same reason. 
V. QUESTIONS OF FACT REGARDING WHETHER THE GAZEBO 
DESCRIBED IN BROWN RESPONSE IS THE SAME AS THE ONE 
DESCRIBED IN BRIGGS OFFER PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
On pages 19-23 of their brief, Defendants argue that there is no difference between 
the gazebo Mr. Briggs demanded in Briggs Offer and the one Defendants claim to have 
ordered in Brown Response. They argue that color, model year, and size differences are 
not material. Mr. Briggs has said that the gazebo described by Defendants in Brown 
Response is not what he agreed to accept (R. at 489). As the party moving for summary 
judgment, Defendants must present undisputed facts proving that there was a meeting of 
l i 
the minds on all material terms and conditions, and they have not done so. "[T]he burden 
of proof for showing the parties' mutual assent as to all material terms and conditions is 
on the party claiming that there is a contract." Cal Wadsworth Const, v. City of St. 
George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah 1995). These differences, along with the conditional 
language used by Defendants in Brown Response asking for Mr. Briggs agreement, make 
Brown Response a counter-offer, or at least present genuine, material disputed facts 
precluding summary judgment. 
VI. MR. BRIGGS9 SUIT WAS MERITORIOUS IN FACT AND LAW 
"A claim is without merit if it is of little weight or importance having no basis in law 
or fact." Sonnenreich, supra, \ 47 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Appellant's opening brief, at 12-14 states the unrebutted facts: Mr. Briggs paid 
Defendants more than $8,900, more than four years before this suit, for a specific model 
Cal Spas hot tub and gazebo. Defendants could not deliver when Mr. Briggs demanded 
delivery because they no longer carried Cal Spas products. Mr. Briggs demanded a refund 
or equivalent merchandise, Defendants refused. Negotiations broke down and Mr. Briggs 
sued. 
Defendants' response to this suit was to twist a letter sent just before negotiations 
broke down into an "unconditional acceptance" of a previous offer to settle by Mr. Briggs 
(Briggs Offer, R. at 184; Addendum tab 3). Even though Defendants' Nov. 11, 1999 
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(Brown Response, R. at 185; Addendum tab 4) promises to pay a refund by Nov. 18, 1999 
that Defendants did not pay, and even though the gazebo described in Brown Response 
was not as demanded in Briggs Offer, and even though Brown Response demands that 
Mr. Briggs agree with its terms and identifies itself as a proposal, Defendants insist that 
their letter was an "unconditional acceptance" of Mr. Briggs' letter. At the District Court, 
this argument prevailed and the court granted summary judgment dismissing Mr. Briggs' 
complaint. 
This case is rife with material questions of fact: what gazebo Mr. Briggs did demand 
(Br. of Appellant at 19 cf Opp'n Br. at 19); whether the gazebo Brown Response 
described was that gazebo (Br. of Appellant at 19 cf Opp'n Br. at 20); whether Mr. 
Briggs1 demand that Defendants get back with Mr. Briggs and totally resolve this issue by 
November 20, 1999 was a demand just to communicate or a demand to complete 
performance on his offer by that date (Br. of Appellant at 19 cf Opp'n Br. at 18); whether 
the Brown Response amounted to an unconditional acceptance despite its conditions (Br. 
of Appellant at 20 cf Opp'n Br. at 16); whether, if there was an unconditional acceptance, 
Defendants were in breach by not delivering the refund and gazebo (Br. of Appellant at 
33 c/Opp'n Br. at 27-28). 
Defendants have also impliedly admitted that Mr. Briggs' suit had merit regarding at 
least the more than $8,900 Mr. Briggs paid to Defendants (Opp'n Br. at 26). 
These disputes militate against the District Court's first grant of summary judgment 
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and they do not support a conclusion that Mr. Briggs' complaint was frivolous or "of little 
weight or importance having no basis in law or fact." Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 
(Utah 1983). 
Since lack of merit is a legal conclusion, this Court reviews the District Court's 
conclusion for correctness (see, e.g., Sonnenreich, supra), and since this conclusion was 
reached in summary judgment proceedings, this Court gives no deference to the trial 
court, viewing the undisputed facts and all reasonable inferences drawn from them in the 
light most favorable to Mr. Briggs (see, e.g., Alder v. Bayer Corp., AGFA Div., 2002 UT 
115). 
When the undisputed facts are viewed in a light most favorable to Mr. Briggs, the 
conclusion that this suit was without merit is wrong and the District Court's judgment 
must be reversed. 
VII. CONTRARY TO DEFENDANTS' ASSERTION, THE BAD FAITH 
ALLEGATION AGAINST MR. BRIGGS IS STRONGLY DISPUTED. 
Defendants assert, repeatedly, that it is undisputed that Mr. Briggs filed this suit in bad 
faith (see, e.g., Opp'n Br., at 34, ^ jl, Opp'n Br., at 35, ^|5, Opp'n Br., at 5, fflflO-1 1). "[A] 
finding of bad faith turns on a factual determination of a party's subjective intent." 
(Sonnenreich, supra, ^[47). To demonstrate bad faith Defendants must prove one or more 
of the following is lacking: "(I) [a]n honest belief in the propriety of the activities in 
14 
question; (2) no intent to take unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or 
knowledge of the fact that the activities in question will hinder, delay, or defraud others." 
{Sonnenreich, supra, f48, quoting Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983) alteration 
in original). 
Since Defendants have not produced a "smoking gun" {e.g. a competent affidavit that 
"Mr. Briggs told me he did not honestly believe in the propriety of this lawsuit.") and Mr. 
Briggs has not filed a conclusory and obviously self-serving affidavit {e.g. "I honestly 
believe in the propriety of this lawsuit"), Defendants' burden, as movants at summary 
judgment is very high; the undisputed facts must foreclose the possibility that a jury could 
find for Mr. Briggs on the factual question of bad faith. "We repeat, however, that the 
plaintiff, to survive the defendant's motion, need only present evidence from which a jury 
might return a verdict in his favor. If he does so, there is a genuine issue of fact that 
requires a trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 257 (1986). 
Defendants must show that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to 
Mr. Briggs, allow for no other reasonable conclusion than Mr. Briggs' subjective intent 
rose to bad faith. ("It is inappropriate for courts to weigh disputed material facts in ruling 
on a summary judgment. It matters not that the evidence on one side may appear to be 
strong or even compelling." Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 
App. 1988)(citation omitted)). Defendants must prove that no sworn statement of Mr. 
Briggs disputes the purported finding of bad faith. "One sworn statement under oath is all 
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that is needed to dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy and create an 
issue of fact, precluding the entry of summary judgment." Id. 
In his sworn response to Defendants' interrogatories, Mr. Briggs gives a detailed 
account of his dealings with Defendants. For example, he recounts a conversation with 
Defendant, Lowell Brown, in which, after telling Mr. Briggs that he would not get what 
he had already paid for, Defendant Brown threatens that if Mr. Briggs was going to "put 
him in a position that were just gonna butt heads that's fine then we butt heads, you have 
to do what you gotta do, I gotta do what I gotta do." (R. at 488; errors in original). Mr. 
Briggs goes on to express his opinion that Defendants "had done nothing but try and 
cheat me from day one ... and I wasn't going to [accept] his mystery gazebo [i.e. the 
gazebo Defendants claim to have ordered] to settle this matter. I figured the only way to 
stop him from doing this to me was to take him up on his offer and get an attorney." (R. at 
491). Later, "I went to [Plaintiffs counsel, Greg Smith] and had him proceed that day." 
Id. Thus, we see Defendants playing "hardball" with Mr. Briggs, even challenging him to 
"butt heads" and to get a lawyer. What we do not see in the record is undisputed evidence 
that conclusively shows Mr. Briggs' alleged lack of good faith. 
In fact, considering that Mr. Briggs had fully paid Defendants for a particular spa and 
gazebo four years earlier and Defendants dogged refusal to live up to their end of the 
bargain, the entirety of Mr. Briggs' interrogatory responses (R. at 485-496) demonstrates 
his great patience in dealing with Defendants. 
16 
Mr. Briggs only remaining duty under that contract was to enjoy the spa and gazebo 
he had paid for four years earlier. Rather than deal with Mr. Briggs honestly and fairly, 
and give him what he what he was entitled to, Defendants chose to "butt heads." Mr. 
Briggs, unable to persuade Defendants to deal with him fairly, sought his remedy in court, 
as Article 1, § 11 of the Utah state Constitution declares he has the right to. 
VIII. DEFENDANTS5 BRIEF VIOLATES UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE, 24(J) AND SHOULD BE DISREGARDED 
The rules are clear about the requirements of briefing to this Court: 
Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with 
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, 
irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may 
be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may 
assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer." 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(j). 
In what seems to be an effort to bury Mr. Briggs and the Court in an avalanche of 
immaterial minutiae, Defendants offer many serial citations to the record that do not serve 
to prove that which Defendants must prove, that the undisputed/acte compel summary 
judgment. For example, see Opp'n Br., at 35, TJ5 where Defendants proclaim: "Mr. Briggs 
made repeated misrepresentations of fact to the trial court." Defendants then cite 48 
paragraphs, spanning from page 419 to page 688 in the record that "prove" this point. 
However, each of these citations is to memoranda, either in support of Defendants' 
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second motion for summary judgment, or to Mr. Briggs' memorandum in opposition. 
Defendants' brief does not cite to affidavits, sworn interrogatories, or deposition 
testimony. 
All of these burdensome citations to previous argument do nothing to prove thereto 
Defendants must prove. However, they do make a telling point as to why this litigation 
has lasted 4Vi years. 
These dizzying citations offer no undisputed material facts demonstrating conclusively 
that Mr. Briggs suit was meritless and Mr. Briggs subjectively brought and pursued this 
case in bad faith. What they do suggest is the "oft-quoted adage: If the law is against you, 
argue the facts; if the facts are against you, argue the law; and if they both are against 
you, pound the table and attack your opponent." U.S. v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912, 927 (7 Cir. 
1996). 
Furthermore, Defendants misrepresent the facts to this Court. For example, they cite a 
case holding that affidavits made on "information and belief are insufficient to provoke 
a genuine dispute of fact (Opp'n Br. at 31) when Defendants know that the affidavits, 
which they did not object to at the District Court, are made on "personal knowledge and 
belief (Id.) regarding matters that Mr. Briggs is competent to testify to, and therefore 
sufficient. 
In another example, Defendants blend two paragraphs of the Briggs Offer to make it 
appear, falsely, that they are part of one thought. By eliminating the blank line between 
18 
the deadline paragraph and the closing paragraph (with instructions on how to reach Mr. 
Briggs) Defendants make it appear that the two separate paragraphs are one (i.e. "you can 
contact me" is a continuation of "get back to me and totally resolve") (see Opp'n Br. at 
18, bottom block quote). Defendants obscure this omission by including an ellipsis, but 
the only thing omitted is the blank line that indicates a new paragraph. That blank line 
makes a clear break between the deadline paragraph and the contact information 
paragraph. The blank line is necessary to understanding the context. Defendants' tricky 
omission violates their duty to present with accuracy. 
IX, DEFENDANTS ADMIT THAT MR. BRIGGS RAISED GENUINE DISPUTES 
OPPOSING DEFENDANTS9 SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
"One sworn statement under oath is all that is needed to dispute the averments on the 
other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding the entry of summary 
judgment." Lucky Seven, supra, at 752. 
Defendants admit that Mr. Briggs raised genuine disputes to their second motion for 
summary judgment (Opp'n Br. at 28, 29). Defendants then argue that these disputes were 
not necessary to their claim, so it was acceptable for the District Court to grant summary 
judgment in spite of them. However, Defendants are the ones who declared that these 
facts were material. Defendants now try to duck the consequences by claiming that the 
material facts, which they admit are in dispute, are not material for Utah R. Civ. P. 56 
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purposes ("[TJhose disputes are immaterial within the meaning of Rule 56." Opp'n Br. at 
29). While claiming that these disputed facts are not material "within the meaning of Rule 
56," Defendants appear to forget that the motion wherein they certified that the facts they 
recited were material was a Rule 56 motion. 
Defendants then, on page 29 of their brief, quote Kesler v. Kesler, 583 P.2d 87 (Utah 
1978). Kesler, is not relevant to Defendants' argument. In Kesler, plaintiff (defendants' 
mother) sued for quiet title. Defendants alleged that their late father (plaintiffs husband) 
had intended the property be passed to them in a partnership. The court found this 
argument to have no legal bearing on the question of title to the property, in effect saying 
Defendants allegations were immaterial. "The statements made by defendants in their 
depositions and those made by counsel in his proffer of proof do nothing to invalidate 
plaintiffs title under joint tenancy." Id. at 88. The court concludes, "|t]here is no issue of 
fact as to property ownership and the lower court's decision is hereby affirmed." Id at 89. 
The facts of this case are nothing like Kesler. The Kesler defendants did not present a 
cognizable defense. Mr. Briggs has a cognizable defense; that he did not bring his suit in 
bad faith and that it does have merit, so Kesler is not on point. 
Defendants concede that Mr. Briggs did raise a genuine dispute about material facts, 
just not the right material facts. Defendants are playing a shell game with Mr. Briggs and 
the Court, saying in effect: guess which "undisputed material facts" are really material. 
Defendants should not be allowed to succeed in court by tossing around 87 allegations in 
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their motion for summary judgment — certifying to the District Court (pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 11) that these allegations are undisputed and material — and then, once the facts 
are disputed, declare that those allegations that Mr. Briggs did dispute are not really 
material. 
X. DEFENDANTS DID NOT RAISE THEIR PURPORTED ALTERNATIVE 
BASIS FOR AFFIRMING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN DISTRICT COURT 
Defendants argue that Mr. Briggs' interrogatories provide an alternate basis for 
affirming summary judgment (Opp'n Br. at 11, n5). Defendants correctly point out that 
the District Court did not rely on the supposed oral agreement mentioned by Mr. Briggs, 
but Defendants fail to say that the reason the court did not rely on it was that Defendants 
did not raise it. 
While Utah law allows for alternate bases for affirmation, it does not consider such 
bases if they were not raised at the District Court: "Summary judgment may be affirmed 
on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied on below." Smith v. 
Four Corners Mental Health, 2003 UT 23, y\2 (quotation mark and citation omitted). 
"Regarding their first alternative argument, the [Appellees] admit that they did not argue 
this question before the district court.... Because we do not consider issues raised for the 
first time on appeal, summary judgment cannot rest on this argument." Id. at J^44 
(citations omitted). 
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Although some Utah cases prior to Smith allow for alternative bases not raised at the 
court below {see, e.g. Bailey v. Bayles 2002 UT 58, ^ [10, 52 P.3d 1158), such an approach 
is unavailing here, because it leaves as many, or more, factual questions unanswered, e.g. 
what did Mr. Briggs offer? Were Defendants in breach? Was this an offer and acceptance 
in the legal sense? Also, the argument ignores the words directly following Defendants' 
purported acceptance, which say that Defendants were going to draft and send an 
agreement for Mr. Briggs' approval (implying that final agreement was still pending), and 
the next paragraph, which says that the gazebo described in the letter was not what Mr. 
Briggs' had offered to accept (R. at 489). 
TABLE OF DISPUTED MATERIAL QUESTIONS OF FACT 
In reviewing summary judgment, only two questions are pertinent: (1) are there 
disputed material facts? and (2) did the court below correctly apply the law? In this case, 
there have always been disputed material facts, and the District Court misapplied the law 
on both summary judgments. Defendants' brief to this Court focuses so much on these 
facts that the disputes become unmistakably clear. 
The following table concisely and conveniently presents some of the key disputes of 
fact that warrant reversing the summary judgments entered, and remanding for trial on the 
merits. 
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Material Question 
of Fact 
Is Brown Response 
an unconditional 
acceptance of 
Briggs Offer? 
Is Brown 
Response's 
"unconditional 
acceptance" 
conditioned on Mr. 
Brigg's signature 
indicating 
acceptance? 
Defendants' position 
Brown Response 
unconditionally 
accepted Briggs Offer 
(R. at 418^5) 
-or-
Defendants agreed to 
Mr. Briggs oral offer, 
made on November 9, 
1999, and then also 
accepted the Briggs 
Offer (Opp'n Br. at 6; 
1H6-7) 
Signature requirement 
simply acknowledges 
what is legally implicit 
in the settlement offer 
(Opp'n Br. at 12). 
! Mr. Briggs' 
position 
1 Mr. Briggs never 
agreed to accept the 
1999 Cal Spas 
gazebo (R. at 621; 
also R. at 210419). 
-and-
Brown Response did 
not correspond to the 
offer Mr. Briggs had 
made orally (R. at 
621). 
-and-
The final three 
sentences of Brown 
Response, asking for 
Mr. Briggs' 
agreement and 
identifying Brown 
Response as a 
"proposal" are not 
consistent with 
unconditional 
acceptance. (Brown 
Response, R. at 
185). 
Brown Response's 
words asking for 
acceptance and 
styling itself as a 
proposal speak for 
themselves (R. at 
185; Addendum tab 
3). 
Status 
Disputed 
Disputed 
23 
Is Defendants' 
acceptance of 
Briggs Offer 
demonstrated by 
Defendants' 
actions? 
Is Defendants' non-
acceptance proved 
! by Defendants' 
failure to comply 
with their own terms 
that directed a 
refund to Briggs? 
Did Mr. Briggs 
demand 
performance by 
November 20, 
1999? 
Did Defendants 
repudiate their 
ostensible 
agreement? 
Defendants did order 
the gazebo 
(presumably, the one 
Mr. Briggs had agreed 
to accept) (Opp'n Br. 
at 14). 
Defendants are silent 
on the point that their 
ostensible 
unconditional 
acceptance required 
them to pay refund by 
November 18, 1999. 
Mr. Briggs demanded 
acceptance by 
November 20, 1999 
(Opp'n Br, at 13). 
-or-
Mr. Brown had 
already accepted Mr. 
Briggs oral offer prior 
to Briggs Offer (Opp'n 
Br, at 4, f 6). 
Defendants never 
repudiated ostensible 
agreement (R. at 518, 
112)-
Mr. Briggs never 
agreed to accept a 
1999 Cal Spas 
gazebo (R. at 621, R. 
at 210,1|19), 
therefore any gazebo 
they might have 
ordered was not 
demonstration of 
acceptance, 
-and-
Defendants have 
never tendered the 
refund they 
promised to pay by 
November 18, 1999 
(R. at 561, f 2) 
Defendants have 
never tendered the 
refund promised by 
November 18, 1999 
(R. at 56142) 
Refund was 
demanded by 
November 20, 1999 
(R. at 563,lfl5) 
Mr. Brown called 
off any deal (R. at 
564,125). 
Disputed 
Undisputed 
Disputed 
Disputed 
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CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth in Appellant's opening brief and reply brief, Appellant 
respectfully requests this Court to reverse the summary judgments and award of attorneys' 
fees, and remand this case to the District Court for further proceedings. 
DATED this / ' 3 day of /"^jf _, 2004. 
Gregory B.' 
Attorney for Mr. Briggs 
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